Perfect foresight portfolios on the Johannesburg stock exchange by Van der Merwe, R. & Krige, J. D.
S.Afr.J.Bus.Manage.2017,48(2) 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Perfect foresight portfolios on the Johannesburg stock exchange 
 
 
R. van der Merwe and J.D. Krige* 
Stellenbosch University, Private Bag X1, Matieland, 7602 
 
 
*To whom all correspondence should be addressed  
jdkrige@sun.ac.za 
 
 
The main aim of this study was to determine the effect of unanticipated information, or noise, on the returns of cap-weighted 
portfolios in various segments of the JSE for the period 1995 to 2014. 
 
According to Fuller, Han and Tung (2012), all investors in a segment would gain maximum alpha from a portfolio weighted 
by ex post market capitalisation – in other words, a ‘perfect foresight’ (PF) portfolio.  The PF portfolio is a buy-and-hold 
portfolio of all shares in a particular segment with weights at the beginning of the return period set to be proportional to the 
market capitalisation of the shares at the end of the return period.  The excess return of the PF portfolio over the benchmark 
portfolio therefore is an estimate of the effect of unanticipated information on the return of the benchmark portfolio.  It 
provides an estimate of the maximum annual amount of available alpha to all investors involved in that segment in a given 
year.  In this study, the returns of PF portfolios were compared with the All Share, Large Cap, Mid Cap and Small Cap 
segments of the JSE. 
 
Intuitively, information to guide decisions on portfolio weighting would be more valuable and deliver more profit when 
the cross-sectional standard deviation of share returns is high.  Therefore a secondary aim was to investigate the correlation 
between cross-sectional standard deviation and PF excess return. It was found that a strong positive correlation (more than 
90%) existed between cross-sectional standard deviation and PF excess return in all segments. 
 
In ascending order of annual PF excess return and average cross-sectional standard deviation the results for the segments 
were:  Large Cap (8% and 29%), All Share (9% and 32%), Mid Cap (13% and 36%) and Small Cap (17% and 43%). 
 
Introduction 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) states that the 
optimal risky portfolio consists of all the shares in a segment 
weighted by market capitalisation.  Its elegant simplicity and 
promise of optimal risk-return benefit inspired a generation 
of investors to choose index tracking as an investment 
approach, but this approach is a strategy to match the market, 
not to beat it. 
 
Active investment management, on the other hand, is aimed 
at outperforming the market.   Active managers seek alpha by 
deviating from market capitalisation and creating portfolios 
that are overweight in shares they believe will become 
‘winner’ shares and underweight in shares they believe will 
become ‘loser’ shares.  The performance (ex post returns) of 
active managers is often measured against the cap-weighted 
benchmark portfolio. 
 
This study investigated ‘valuation’ efficiency in cap-
weighted JSE segments.  Share prices reflect the market’s 
consensus expectations of future value, but realised future 
value rarely equals expected value, because unanticipated 
information causes unexpected price changes during the 
investment period. 
 
The primary aim of this study was to determine the effect of 
unanticipated information on the returns of cap-weighted 
portfolios for the main segments of the JSE.  The study 
included the All Share, Top 40, Mid Cap and Small Cap 
segments for the period 1995 to 2014.  Not only are these 
indices popular with investors, but they are also common 
benchmarks for active management. 
 
Intuitively, unanticipated information and a high dispersion 
of annual share returns should provide active investors with 
more profitmaking opportunities.  Therefore a secondary aim 
was to investigate the correlation between excess returns and 
cross-sectional standard deviation. 
 
The methodology used in this study is based on the one 
developed by Fuller, Han and Tung (2012).  They used 
CAPM and the concept of ‘perfect foresight’ (PF) to estimate 
the effect of unanticipated information on the returns of cap-
weighted portfolios. 
 
Although individual investors in a segment can hold 
portfolios consisting of any shares in any quantity, they 
collectively hold all shares in the segment weighted by 
market capitalisation.  The ex ante cap-weighted portfolio, 
consisting of all shares in a segment, is an optimal portfolio 
that lies on the ex ante efficient frontier.  It represents the 
market’s consensus expectations of returns in the segment. If 
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estimates of future value are 100% accurate, the ex ante 
market portfolio would also lie on the ex post efficient 
frontier. It is however an improbable scenario as some level 
of ex ante mispricing always exists due to information 
unavailable and unanticipated at t=0.  The ex ante market 
portfolio therefore tends to be overweight in ‘loser’ shares, or 
shares that will not achieve their expected return, and 
underweight in ‘winner’ shares, or shares that will exceed 
their expected return.  These ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ shares are 
created when prices change unexpectedly during the 
investment period.  Noise is the array of factors causing 
unexpected price changes.  It includes rational behaviour such 
as the correction of ex ante mispricing and market reaction to 
new information, as well as irrational investor behaviour. 
 
Fuller et al. (2012) defined the PF portfolio as the portfolio 
that investors in the segment would have chosen, as a group, 
had they had PF about price changes caused by noise during 
the investment period.  The PF portfolio consists of the same 
shares as the benchmark portfolio, but is weighted by ex post 
market capitalisation and lies on the ex post efficient frontier.  
The PF portfolio therefore is a buy-and-hold portfolio of all 
shares in a particular segment with weights at the beginning 
of the return period set to be proportional to the market 
capitalisation of the shares at the end of the return period. 
 
If accepted as a valid estimate of the maximum potential 
alpha across all investors in a segment, PF excess return could 
serve as a useful benchmark in the evaluation of active 
managers’ goals, performance and reward.  If the PF excess 
return is only 1%, it is unlikely that active managers will beat 
the segment benchmark for that period.  A larger difference, 
say 20%, would significantly increase the probability for an 
active manager to outperform the benchmark (Fuller et al., 
2012).  Finally, when maximum potential alpha is 5%, should 
one expect superior active managers in the segment to earn 
half of it, say 2% to 3% (Fuller et al., 2012)? 
 
This study is organised as follows.  Section 2 consists of a 
literature review which includes a description of factors 
causing inefficiencies in the market.  Section 3 provides a 
description of the data required for the study and the specific 
methodology employed.  Section 4 reports and analyses the 
findings of the study.  It starts with a detailed description of 
the findings for the All Share segment, followed by 
summarised result sets and descriptions for the other 
segments.  In conclusion, Section 5 provides a summary of 
the main findings, a description of the limitations of the study, 
as well as recommendations for future research. 
 
Literature review 
 
De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) defined 
‘noise traders’ as investors who do not act rationally 
according to Modern Portfolio Theory.  These 
unsophisticated investors may be unaware of or 
misunderstand the link between fundamental value and share 
price.  They often pick shares based on hunches, systems, 
flawed personal research or the irrational advice of brokers, 
investment journals and investor clubs.  In addition, they fail 
to diversify and hold a single share or a small number of 
shares (Lewellen, Schlarbaum & Lease, 1974). 
 
Although the abundance of noise traders has historically been 
recognised, it was thought that their effect on share prices was 
neutralised by rational investors who traded against them to 
exploit arbitrage opportunities and, in the process, drove 
prices close to fundamental values (Fama,1965). Irrational 
noise traders were expected to lose money in the long term 
and eventually disappear from the market.  Shiller, Fischer 
and Friedman (1984), and Campbell and Kyle (1993) found 
however that rational investors were averse to the risk that 
noise trader opinions may cause prices to change even further 
from fundamental values and therefore chose not to trade 
against them, especially in the short run.  De Long et al. 
(1990) also found that the unpredictability of unsophisticated 
investors' opinions significantly reduced the attractiveness of 
arbitrage. As long as rational arbitrageurs have short horizons 
and worry about liquidating their investments in mispriced 
assets, their aggressiveness is limited even in the absence of 
fundamental risk. Irrational noise trading can therefore lead 
to large differences between fundamental values and market 
prices. 
 
Black (1986) agreed that irrational traders contributed to 
noise in financial markets, but defined noise much wider than 
De Long et al. (1990) did.  According to Black (1986), noise 
is an array of unrelated factors that cause investor 
observations to be imperfect. He argued that, if information 
is the only cause for trade, investors will hold individual 
assets but will trade only rarely to manage their exposure to 
market risk.  An investor may want to trade on information 
received, but will struggle to find a counterparty to his trade 
if all other market participants hold well diversified portfolios 
and have exactly the same insight.  If there is a trade, one of 
the parties must be making a mistake and, if those making 
mistakes decline to trade, there will be no trading on 
information and financial markets would not ‘work’.  
Financial markets therefore depend on investors who 
interpret information differently or incorrectly and make 
mistakes.  Investors use noise as if it was information and 
trade, even when it does not make rational sense to do so.  
Noise causes share prices to stray from theoretical values and 
realised returns to differ from expected returns (Black, 1986). 
 
Similar to Black (1986), Fuller et al. (2012) defined noise as 
all factors that cause prices to change unexpectedly during an 
investment period.  To estimate the effect of noise on the 
returns of cap-weighted market portfolios, Fuller et al. (2012) 
used CAPM and the concept of PF.  Their definition of PF 
was similar in spirit, but empirically different to Shiller (1979 
& 1981), LeRoy and LaCivita (1981), and Arnott, Li and 
Sherrerd (2009), because Fuller et al. (2012) applied the 
concept of PF to the weighting of ex ante market portfolios 
rather than share price or value. 
 
Although individual investors can construct portfolios as they 
prefer, Fuller et al. (2012) assumed that all investors in the 
market would construct an aggregate portfolio weighted by 
ex post market capitalisation if they had PF.  Fuller et al.’s 
(2012) PF portfolio therefore consisted of exactly the same 
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shares as the benchmark portfolio, but the PF portfolio was 
weighted by market capitalisation at the end of the investment 
period (t=1) whereas the benchmark portfolio was weighted 
by market capitalisation at the start of the investment period 
(t=0). 
 
Fuller et al. (2012) proved that returns from the ex ante 
efficient portfolio are always inferior to the ex post efficient 
frontier.  This is due to the correction of ex ante mispricing 
and the arrival of information unavailable and unanticipated 
by investors at the ex ante stage.  This information causes 
unexpected price changes to create ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ 
shares. 
 
The effect of noise may therefore be estimated as the amount 
by which the benchmark portfolio is inferior to the ex post 
efficient frontier.  Fuller et al. (2012: 63) provided analytical 
proof that the PF portfolio lies on the ex post efficient frontier.  
The amount by which the PF portfolio return exceeds that of 
the benchmark portfolio is therefore an estimate of the effect 
of noise on the return of the benchmark portfolio. 
 
Because both the benchmark portfolio and PF portfolio 
consist of the same shares, only weighted differently, the two 
portfolios have similar risk characteristics.  The excess return 
(ERy) of the PF portfolio is therefore an indication of the 
maximum amount of alpha, or ex ante mispricing, available 
to all investors in a specific segment. 
 
Intuitively, when cross-sectional standard deviation in the 
market portfolio is high, private information would be more 
valuable and informed investors would be able to profit more 
from their information advantage.  In fact, cross-sectional 
dispersion of returns is a required enabler of active 
management.  If there were no dispersion in share returns, 
active managers would find it impossible to distinguish 
between ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ shares and it would be 
impossible to beat the benchmark (Gorman, Sapra & 
Weigard, 2010).  As expected, Fuller et al. (2012) also found 
a strong positive correlation between PF excess return and 
cross-sectional standard deviation of share returns. 
 
Fuller et al. (2012) showed that the total PF excess return for 
the Large Cap US equity market segment, or the 1 000 largest 
US shares based on market value, was on average 7.2% per 
year for the period 1951 to 2009.  This can be thought of as 
the maximum amount of alpha, or ex ante mispricing, 
available to all investors in the Large Cap US equity market 
segment. 
 
Data collection 
 
The calculation of PF excess return required a range of 
datasets from the JSE and other sources.  Index data were 
required to construct segment portfolios, whilst share prices, 
dividends, market capitalisation and free float data were 
required to calculate portfolio weights and returns.  In 
addition, data on corporate actions such as company renames, 
share splits and consolidations were required to enable 
accurate return calculations. 
For the period June 2002 to December 2014, the JSE provided 
four data sets containing monthly constituent data for the 
FTSE/JSE Top 40 (J200), Mid Cap (J201), Small Cap (J202) 
and All Share (J203) indices.  In addition, the JSE provided 
Peregrine Quants backtrack data listing J203-compatible 
companies for March 1995 to June 2002. 
 
JSE SENS articles, quarterly index reviews, company 
websites and Who Owns Whom (2014) provided information 
on company name changes, listings and delistings.  To ensure 
continuity in annual return calculations, all data for renamed 
companies were recorded with the latest company name. 
 
For the period 2002 to 2014, the JSE provided free float 
market capitalisation data for the All Share Index (J203).  For 
the years 1995 to 2002, the JSE provided gross market 
capitalisation data and the Peregrine Quants backtrack free 
float data. 
 
Finally, the JSE provided the following data sets for prices, 
dividends and corporate actions: 
 
 A data set containing all dividends paid in the period 
January 1995 to December 2014. 
 A data set containing All Share splits and consolidations 
in the period January 1995 to December 2014. 
 Data sets containing daily J203 share prices for the period 
June 2002 to December 2014. 
 A data set per year containing daily CI01 (the predecessor 
of J203) share prices for the period December 1994 to 
June 2002.  
 
Daily price data were required to capture share prices at 
delisting. 
 
Research methodology 
 
Using the methodology of Fuller et al. (2012), PF excess 
return was calculated as an estimate of the effect of noise on 
the returns of cap-weighted portfolios in various JSE 
segments.  The measurement period for the calculation of 
portfolio returns was a calendar year with t=0 on 
31 December of year 0 and t=1 on 31 December of year 1.  It 
was assumed that both the benchmark and the PF portfolios 
were buy-and-hold portfolios rebalanced once a year on 31 
December.  In addition, leverage and short selling were not 
allowed. 
 
To ensure that the benchmark and PF portfolios contained the 
same shares, portfolios were constructed using JSE index 
constituents at t=0.  For the years 2003 to 2014, segments 
were based on FTSE/JSE index constituents on 31 December 
of year 0.  Deriving segment constituents for the period 1995 
to 2002, the Peregrine Quants backtrack All Share segment 
constituents were used. 
 
To find Large Cap, Mid Cap and Small Cap segment 
constituents, shares from the derived All Share data were 
grouped into segments. The 40 largest companies were 
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allocated to the Large Cap segment, the next 60 to the Mid 
Cap segment and the remainder to the Small Cap segment. 
 
Transaction costs were ignored and monthly share returns 
were based on dividends received and capital gain or loss due 
to price changes.  Monthly returns were adjusted to 
incorporate share splits and consolidations.  Companies that 
delisted during the year were incorporated in the PF portfolio 
until the last month of delisting in order to eliminate 
survivorship bias.  In addition, monthly returns were 
winsorised at a 1% level to remove outliers. 
 
The adjusted market capitalisation of a share is the product of 
its price and number of free float shares. In a market cap-
weighted portfolio, the weight wi assigned to share i’s return 
is its adjusted market capitalisation divided by the total 
adjusted market capitalisation of the portfolio. 
 
The benchmark portfolio held all shares in the segment with 
weights proportional to free float market capitalisation at the 
beginning of the period (t=0): 
 
wi,y,0  =  
pi,y,0  si,y,0
∑ pi,y,0  si,y,0
n
1=1
  (1) 
 
where  
 
wi,y,0  =  weight of share i at the start (t=0) of year y,  
pi,y,0  =  price of share i at point t=0 of year y, and 
si,y,0  =  free float shares in issue for share i at point 
t=0 of year y. 
 
The PF portfolio, on the other hand, was weighted by ex 
post market capitalisation: 
wi,y,1  =  
pi,y,1  si,y,1
∑ pi,y,1  si,y,1
n
1=1
 (2) 
 
The realised ex post return of the benchmark portfolio was: 
 
RBP,y = ∑ wi,y,0.Ri,y
n
i=1   (3) 
 
where 
 
RBP,y  =  return for the benchmark portfolio for the 
year y,  
 
and 
 
Ri   =  realised annual return for share i in the 
period t=(0-1). 
 
The realised ex post return of the PF portfolio was: 
 
RPFP,y = ∑ wi,y,1.Ri,y
n
i=1      (4) 
 
where 
 
RPFP,y  =  return for the PF portfolio in year y. 
 
Using Fuller et al.’s (2012) methodology, the negative effect 
of noise on the return of the benchmark portfolio was 
estimated as the amount by which the return of the PF 
portfolio exceeded that of the benchmark portfolio.  
Annual PF excess return was therefore: 
 
ERy = RPFP,y -   RBP,y                   (5) 
 
ERy = ∑
i=n
i=1 (wi,y,1 - wi,y,0)Ri,y  (6) 
 
where   
  
ERy  =  excess return for the PF portfolio for 
investment year y. 
 
Results 
 
All share segment results 
 
Table 1 lists the PF portfolio and benchmark (BP) returns, 
excess returns and cross-sectional standard deviations of the 
All Share segment for the years 1995 to 2014.  Summary 
statistics at the bottom of Table 1 show that the standard 
deviation of annual portfolio returns was 23.06% for the PF 
portfolio and 21.41% for the benchmark portfolio.  The 
correlation of the PF and benchmark portfolio return series 
was 96.43% with a beta of 1.04.  The similar risk 
characteristics are not surprising, because the two portfolios 
comprised exactly the same shares every year, only weighted 
differently. 
 
Although PF and/or benchmark portfolio returns may have 
been negative in some years (1997, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 
2008), PF portfolio returns always exceeded benchmark 
portfolio returns.  These results agree with Fuller et al.’s 
(2012: 52) analytical proof that the benchmark portfolio is an 
inferior portfolio to the ex post efficient frontier on which the 
PF portfolio lies. 
 
The PF excess return column was the focus of this study.  It 
shows the amount by which the PF portfolio return exceeded 
the benchmark portfolio return.  Summary statistics at the 
bottom of Table 1 show that excess return ranged from a low 
of 2.50% (2010 and 2011) to a high of 23.53% (1999), while 
the annualised average was 8.97% for the 20 year period 1995 
to 2014.  In the last 10 years (2005-2014), PF excess return 
did not exceed 7%, except in 2013 when it reached 9.80%. 
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Table 1:  All Share segment benchmark and PF portfolio 
results 
 
 
 
The last column in Table 1 lists year-by-year cross-sectional 
standard deviation.  When comparing the PF excess return 
column and the cross-sectional standard deviation column, it 
is clear that the two are highly correlated. Figure 1 illustrates 
the correlation and summary statistics at the bottom of the 
Table 1 show a correlation coefficient of 93.79%. 
 
The highly correlated result agrees with Fuller et al.’s 
(2012:63) analytical proof of positive correlation between 
cross-sectional standard deviation and excess return.  It also 
agrees with Gorman et al.’s (2010) argument that higher 
volatility of share returns allows more profit making 
opportunities for active management. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: All share segment PF excess return and cross-
sectional standard deviation 
 
Table 1 summary statistics show that cross-sectional standard 
deviation was highest in 1999 (69.27%).  Using Gorman et 
al.’s (2010) argument, 1999 would therefore have provided 
the most opportunities for active managers to exceed the All 
Share benchmark return by deviating from ex ante portfolio 
weights.  Information to guide such decision making would 
have been very valuable and it is not surprising that PF excess 
return was also highest in 1999 (23.53%). 
 
Cross-sectional standard deviation and PF excess return were 
higher and more volatile in the first 10 years than in the next 
10.  Average cross-sectional standard deviation for the first 
10 years (1995-2004) was 40.35% compared to 24.26% for 
the last 10 years (2005-2014).  Average PF excess return, in 
turn, was 12.97% for the first 10 years compared to 5.11% for 
the last 10 years.  Table 2 and Figure 2 show the results by 
five-year periods to illustrate the decline. 
 
Table 2: PF excess return and cross-sectional standard 
deviation by 5 year period 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  PF excess return and cross-sectional standard 
deviation by 5-year period 
 
This decline in average cross-sectional standard deviation 
corresponds to the results of Raubenheimer (2011), who 
investigated annual cross-sectional standard deviation in the 
JSE All Share, Resources, Industrials and Financials 
segments for the period 1997 to 2009.  In addition, it seems 
to follow the trend found by Fuller et al. (2012) in their study 
on PF excess return in various equity segments for the period 
1973 to 2009.  Their results were by decade, which makes 
direct comparison to this study difficult, but they also found 
that cross-sectional standard deviation and excess return were 
higher in the 1990’s than the 2000’s. 
 
Although Ankrim and Ding (2002) suggested that a decrease 
in cross-sectional standard deviation may result from factors 
such as consolidation, later listing of companies in their life 
cycle and the influence of day-traders, it is unclear from this 
study what the causes were.  It does however seem that there 
were more profit making opportunities and higher total 
potential alpha for All Share investors during the first 10 
years than during the last 10 years of the study period. 
 
Large Cap segment results 
 
Table 3 lists the portfolio returns, PF excess returns and cross-
sectional standard deviations of the Large Cap segment for 
the period 1995 to 2014.  Summary statistics at the bottom of 
Table 3 show that cross-sectional standard deviation in the 
Large Cap segment ranged from a low of 14.55% in 2010 to 
a high of 60.87% in 1999.  PF excess return was lowest in 
2010 (1.75%) and highest in 2001 (22.04%).  Investors may 
Year Constituents
PFP return, 
R(PFP) (%)
BP return, 
R(BP) (%)
PF excess 
return (%)
Cross-sectional 
standard deviation (%)
1995 95 16.69 8.61 8.08 28.93
1996 162 13.84 5.57 8.26 31.61
1997 164 7.74 -11.59 19.33 38.42
1998 164 7.69 -4.64 12.33 36.88
1999 164 85.02 61.49 23.53 69.27
2000 164 7.27 -3.53 10.80 36.84
2001 164 53.94 31.33 22.61 58.18
2002 159 -0.78 -10.65 9.87 35.28
2003 170 20.54 14.24 6.29 28.07
2004 162 33.62 23.49 10.13 40.06
2005 160 50.87 45.72 5.15 26.64
2006 162 43.22 39.70 3.52 22.72
2007 164 24.00 17.06 6.95 29.92
2008 166 -20.85 -27.28 6.43 21.30
2009 166 35.59 31.65 3.94 22.96
2010 163 20.67 18.17 2.50 17.69
2011 164 4.75 2.25 2.50 16.67
2012 164 31.93 26.56 5.37 27.48
2013 164 30.72 20.92 9.80 33.44
2014 165 15.41 10.29 5.12 23.73
Annualised return 22.12% 13.04% 8.97%
Return standard deviation 23.06% 21.41%
Tracking error 6.17%
Information ratio 1.48
High 23.53% 69.27%
Low 2.50% 16.67%
Range 21.04% 52.60%
Average 9.13% 32.30%
Correlation of PF portfolio and benchmark returns 96.43%
Beta 1.04
Correlation of excess return and cross-sectional standard deviation 93.79%
Period
Average PF excess 
return (%)
Average cross-sectional 
standard deviation (%)
PF excess return 
standard deviation or 
tracking error (%)
                                  -   
1995-1999 14.14 41.02 6.88
2000-2004 11.81 39.69 6.22
2005-2009 5.19 24.71 1.50
2010-2014 4.84 23.80 2.98
Full study period 8.97 32.30 6.17
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therefore have found 2010 the most difficult year in which to 
beat the benchmark and 2001 the easiest. 
 
Table 3:  Large Cap segment benchmark and PF 
portfolio results 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Large Cap segment PF excess return and 
cross-sectional standard deviation 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the volatility of cross-sectional standard 
deviation and PF excess return for the Large Cap segment.  
Similar to the All Share segment, there was a strong 
correlation (95.69%) between cross-sectional standard 
deviation and PF excess return.  For the first 10 years 
(1995-2004), average cross-sectional standard deviation was 
36.21% and excess return 10.65%.  For last 10 years (2005-
2014), average cross-sectional standard deviation was 
22.73% and excess return 4.57%.  Again, results were lower 
in the last 10 years and investors may have found it more 
difficult to beat the Large Cap benchmark in the last 10 years 
than in the first 10. 
 
Not only were results higher in the first 10 years, but they 
were also more volatile.  Table 3 summary statistics show a 
5.49% tracking error for the period 1995 to 2014.  The 
volatility of PF excess return was higher in the first 10 years 
with a tracking error of 6.05% for the period 1995 to 2004, 
compared to 2.38% for the 10 years 2005 to 2014. 
 
By comparing Figure 3 with Figure 1, one can see that the 
Large Cap segment consistently had lower cross-sectional 
standard deviation and PF excess return than the All Share 
segment. 
 
Summary statistics at the bottom of Table 3 and Table 1 also 
show that average cross-sectional standard deviation was 
lower for the Large Cap segment (29.47%) than the All Share 
segment (32.30%).  As expected, average annual PF excess 
return was also lower for the Large Cap segment (7.57%) than 
the All Share segment (8.97%).  If PF excess return is an 
accepted estimate of the maximum potential alpha available 
to all investors in the segment, the lower annualised excess 
return for the Large Cap segment suggests that it may have 
been more difficult for active managers to outperform the 
Large Cap benchmark than the All Share benchmark. 
 
Mid Cap segment results 
 
Table 4 lists the portfolio returns, excess returns and cross-
sectional standard deviations for the Mid Cap segment.  
Summary statistics at the bottom of Table 4 show that cross-
sectional standard deviation in the Mid Cap segment ranged 
from a low of 20.43% in 2011 to a high of 63.43% in 1999.  
PF excess return was also highest in 1999 (28.58%) and 
lowest in 2011 (2.97%).  Investors may therefore have found 
1999 the easiest year in which to beat the benchmark and 
2011 the most difficult. 
 
Table 4: Mid Cap segment benchmark and PF portfolio 
results 
 
 
 
Year Constituents
PFP return, 
R(PFP) (%)
BP return, 
R(BP) (%)
PF excess 
return (%)
Cross-sectional 
standard deviation (%)
1995 40 16.53 9.34 7.19 27.90
1996 40 11.37 5.72 5.64 28.93
1997 40 1.15 -13.50 14.65 33.28
1998 44 2.81 -5.39 8.19 31.82
1999 42 90.91 70.66 20.25 60.87
2000 42 9.32 1.20 8.12 32.85
2001 42 54.82 32.77 22.04 60.54
2002 40 -5.17 -13.33 8.17 29.36
2003 42 16.86 11.89 4.97 22.17
2004 41 30.27 21.57 8.70 34.41
2005 41 51.98 47.32 4.66 25.28
2006 41 42.92 40.07 2.85 20.79
2007 41 22.15 16.18 5.97 27.92
2008 41 -22.65 -28.47 5.81 20.10
2009 41 35.23 31.76 3.47 21.32
2010 41 18.03 16.28 1.75 14.55
2011 42 4.25 1.97 2.28 15.54
2012 42 30.46 25.40 5.06 26.81
2013 42 32.40 22.38 10.02 34.07
2014 42 12.49 8.45 4.04 20.96
Annualised return 20.52% 12.94% 7.57%
Return standard deviation 24.98% 22.97%
Tracking error 5.49%
Information ratio 1.40
High 22.04% 60.87%
Low 1.75% 14.55%
Range 20.29% 46.33%
Average 7.69% 29.47%
Correlation of PF portfolio and benchmark returns 97.73%
Beta 1.06
Correlation of excess return and cross-sectional standard deviation 95.69%
Year Constituents
PFP return, 
R(PFP) (%)
BP return, 
R(BP) (%)
PF excess 
return (%)
Cross-sectional 
standard deviation (%)
1995 55 17.94 3.38 14.56 37.16
1996 60 21.21 6.90 14.31 37.54
1997 64 20.12 -7.78 27.90 46.02
1998 60 14.45 -2.08 16.53 41.53
1999 62 66.05 37.47 28.58 63.43
2000 62 -15.70 -31.92 16.22 32.03
2001 62 46.68 21.00 25.68 50.53
2002 59 31.49 15.96 15.52 39.28
2003 63 41.09 28.84 12.25 39.44
2004 61 50.72 34.05 16.67 46.88
2005 59 40.43 34.35 6.08 27.61
2006 63 43.73 36.88 6.85 31.63
2007 63 32.34 20.64 11.70 38.59
2008 63 -8.92 -17.64 8.72 27.47
2009 63 38.91 32.63 6.28 27.96
2010 62 34.75 30.61 4.15 24.38
2011 61 7.06 4.08 2.97 20.43
2012 61 39.38 33.01 6.37 32.06
2013 61 19.88 11.81 8.07 31.30
2014 61 29.58 20.77 8.81 33.00
Annualised return 27.00% 13.85% 12.68%
Return standard deviation 19.71% 19.59%
Tracking error 7.57%
Information ratio 1.71
High 28.58% 63.43%
Low 2.97% 20.43%
Range 25.61% 43.00%
Average 12.91% 36.41%
Correlation of PF portfolio and benchmark returns 92.58%
Beta 0.93
Correlation of excess return and cross-sectional standard deviation 90.93%
S.Afr.J.Bus.Manage.2017,48(2) 7 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Mid Cap segment PF excess return and cross-
sectional standard deviation 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the volatility of cross-sectional standard 
deviation and PF excess return for the Mid Cap segment.  
Similar to the All Share and Large Cap segments, there was a 
strong correlation (90.93%) between cross-sectional standard 
deviation and PF excess return.  For the first 10 years (1995-
2004), average cross-sectional standard deviation was 
43.38% and excess return 18.69%.  For the last 10 years 
(2005-2014), average cross-sectional standard deviation was 
29.44% and excess return 6.97%.  Again, results were lower 
in the last 10 years and investors may have found it more 
difficult to beat the Mid Cap benchmark in the last 10 years 
than in the first 10. 
 
When comparing Figure 4 with Figures 1 and 3 it is apparent 
that the Mid Cap segment consistently had both higher cross-
sectional standard deviation and higher PF excess return than 
the All Share and Large Cap segments during the full 20-year 
period (1995-2014). 
 
Summary statistics at the bottom of Tables 1 to 4 also show 
that average cross-sectional standard deviation was higher for 
the Mid Cap (36.41%) than the Large Cap (29.47%) and All 
Share (32.30%) segments. Average annual PF excess return 
was also higher for the Mid Cap (12.68%) than the Large Cap 
(7.57%) and All Share segments (8.97%).  This result 
suggests that it may have been easier for active managers to 
outperform the Mid Cap benchmark than the All Share and 
Large Cap benchmarks. 
 
Small Cap segment results 
 
Table 5 lists the results for the Small Cap segment.  Summary 
statistics show that cross-sectional standard deviation in the 
segment ranged from 21.62% in 2008 to 70.58% in 1998.  PF 
excess return was highest in 1998 (41.91%) and lowest in 
2013 (5.61%).  The 1998 benchmark may therefore have been 
easier to beat than the 2013 one. 
 
Table 5: Small cap segment benchmark and PF portfolio 
results 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Small cap segment PF excess return and cross-
sectional standard deviation 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the volatility of cross-sectional standard 
deviation and PF excess return for the Small Cap segment.  
Similar to the other segments, there was a strong correlation 
(93.03%) between cross-sectional standard deviation and PF 
excess return.  In the first 10 years (1995-2004), average 
cross-sectional standard deviation was 51.90% and PF excess 
return 25.56%.  For the last 10 years (2005-2014), average 
cross-sectional standard deviation was 34.10% and excess 
return 9.26%.  The lower results suggest that investors may 
have found it more difficult to beat the Small Cap benchmark 
in the last 10 years than in the first 10. 
 
When comparing Figure 5 with Figures 1 to 4 it is apparent 
that the Small Cap segment consistently had the highest 
cross-sectional standard deviation and PF excess return for all 
segments during the full 20-year period 1995 to 2014.  
Summary statistics at the bottom of Tables 1 to 5 also show 
that average cross-sectional standard deviation was higher for 
the Small Cap (42.53%) than the Large Cap (29.47%), All 
Share (32.30%) and Mid Cap (36.41%) segments.  Average 
annual PF excess return was also higher for the Small Cap 
(16.70%) than the Large Cap (7.57%), All Share (8.97%) and 
Mid Cap (12.68%) segments.  This result suggests that the 
Small Cap segment offered the most opportunities for active 
Year Constituents
PFP return, 
R(PFP) (%)
BP return, 
R(BP) (%)
PF excess 
return (%)
Cross-sectional 
standard deviation (%)
1995
1996 62 19.45 0.89 18.56 42.75
1997 60 43.45 4.76 38.69 60.33
1998 60 38.87 -3.04 41.91 70.58
1999 60 38.81 9.95 28.86 54.57
2000 60 9.99 -22.73 32.72 48.82
2001 60 43.83 11.86 31.97 58.38
2002 60 20.25 6.98 13.27 39.53
2003 65 51.25 38.61 12.64 42.44
2004 60 59.55 44.09 15.46 49.73
2005 60 57.68 44.69 12.98 40.69
2006 58 51.28 39.63 11.66 37.24
2007 60 44.76 30.50 14.26 43.51
2008 62 -22.98 -29.50 6.52 21.62
2009 62 30.00 22.19 7.81 35.34
2010 60 28.83 19.24 9.59 37.06
2011 61 8.65 1.63 7.02 30.30
2012 61 36.20 28.23 7.97 33.15
2013 61 30.92 25.31 5.61 28.85
2014 62 25.26 15.75 9.51 33.25
Annualised return 30.78% 13.26% 16.70%
Return standard deviation 19.88% 20.81%
Tracking error 11.57%
Information ratio 1.49
High 41.91% 70.58%
Low 5.61% 21.62%
Range 36.31% 48.97%
Average 17.21% 42.53%
Correlation of PF portfolio and benchmark returns 83.93%
Beta 0.80
Correlation of excess return and cross-sectional standard deviation 93.03%
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management and had the highest potential alpha for all 
investors.  Active managers in the Small Cap segment may 
therefore have consistently found it the easiest segment in 
which to outperform the benchmark. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Table 6 summarises the results across segments.  Average 
annual cross-sectional standard deviation and PF excess 
return were lowest in the Large Cap segment (29.47% and 
7.57% respectively) and highest in the Small Cap segment 
(42.53% and 16.70% respectively).  According to Gorman et 
al. (2010), the high cross-sectional standard deviation in the 
Small Cap segment suggests that it offered the most 
opportunities for active management, whilst the Large Cap 
segment offered the least. 
 
Table 6: Summary statistics for various JSE segments, 
1995-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: PF excess return and cross-sectional standard 
deviation for the headline segments 
 
Figure 6 graphically illustrates the results for the different 
segments.  The strong correlation between excess return and 
cross-sectional standard deviation is apparent. All segments 
had a strong correlation, greater than 90%, between excess 
return and cross-sectional standard deviation. 
 
In general, the smaller the average company market 
capitalisation in a segment, the higher the cross-sectional 
standard deviation of the segment and the greater the positive 
impact of price changes on the returns of cap-weighted 
market portfolios.  The bubble size in Figure 6 represents 
average company market capitalisation in the segment as at 
31 December 2014 and the general trend of larger excess 
return for smaller average market capitalisation is clear.  The 
Small Cap segment had by far the greatest cross-sectional 
standard deviation and was most severely affected by 
unexpected price changes as estimated by the PF excess 
return.   
 
Limitations and Recommendations 
 
These results should however be approached with some 
caution.  PF excess return is just an estimate of the maximum 
potential alpha amount across all investors in the segment.  
Because the results are based on cap-weighted segments, it is 
possible for investors to achieve higher returns by owning 
more risky concentrated portfolios consisting of selected 
shares instead of all index constituents. 
 
In addition, much of the price changes and PF excess returns 
are due to the arrival of information that is not available and 
not anticipated at the beginning of the investment period.  It 
is highly unlikely that any investor will ever have ‘perfect 
foresight’ as defined in this study. 
 
Finally, whilst the risk characteristics of the PF portfolio and 
benchmark portfolios are the same, they are not identical.  
The PF excess return is therefore an estimated ex post return 
rather than a precise one.  This implies that the PF excess 
return is an estimate of the ‘valuation efficiency’ of the 
market or the amount of ex ante mispricing relative to the ex 
post efficient frontier. 
 
This study covered 20 years, which is a short period on which 
to base results.  The main obstacle to extending the study 
period beyond 20 years was the availability of All Share and 
free float data.  If estimates of PF excess return prove useful, 
future researchers should consider investigating a longer 
period. 
 
Section 4 showed that average cross-sectional standard 
deviation and PF excess return were higher in the first 10 
years than the last 10 years.  Although it was outside the scope 
of this study to investigate the reasons for the decrease in 
results, it may be useful to understand because it affects 
opportunities for active management. 
 
Finally, an increase in the number of index funds and ETF’s 
tracking different JSE indices may make it useful to extend 
the investigation of cross-sectional standard deviation and PF 
excess return to other JSE segments. 
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